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One of the biggest obstacles to Ethiopia benefiting from the EPRDF’s
devolutionary policies does not lie, as the government’s actions seem
to suggest, with Amhara chauvinists wanting to resurrect a past ethnic
hegemony which is surely buried, but with the Front’s contumacious
implementation of the policy, and its effort to control virtually every
facet of the political process.2

In the 1990s in Africa, two sharply contrasting models of state-society
relations and the role of ethnicity in national affairs have emerged.3
The first is the unitary dispensation that rejects the ethnic classification
of its citizens while cognizant of the ill effects of a race and ethnicbased apartheid order. The African National Congress (ANC) and its
allies in South Africa opted for a strategy they thought would ensure
the country’s political and administrative restructuring but would not
perpetuate sectarian ethnic identity at the expense of citizenship.4 Consequently, the post-apartheid regional administrative structure and
boundaries are not based on ethnicity. Further, the populations in these
regions elect their provincial councils, and have gained some degree of
fiscal autonomy, although South Africa remains a unitary state. A key
manifestation of the system’s competitiveness is the fact that opposition parties have governed two of the wealthiest and most populous
regions for most of the past decade and the ANC has been unable to
dislodge them until the most recent election in 2004.5 Although the
ANC won the most votes in Kwa Zulu–Natal and the Western Cape,
it lacks a majority in these provincial councils to unilaterally form
regional administrations. This openness of the political process has
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made possible a significant degree of regional autonomy in a unitary
system.
The second model is Ethiopia’s ethnically based federal order. This
model anchors citizenship in the soil of ethnic belonging. Advocates of
this framework claimed that dividing the country into ethnic regions
would recognize the country’s primordial reality and bring past injustice to a rapid end:
Sometimes, people in Africa feel that they can wish away ethnic difference. Experience in Rwanda has taught us this is not the case. Experience
in Liberia has taught us that this is not the case. What we are trying to
do in Ethiopia is to recognize that ethnic differences are part of life in
Africa, and try to deal with them in a rational manner. Rather than hide
the fact that we have ethnic difference, we are saying people should
express it freely. That, I think, pre-empts the type of implosion we’ve
had in Rwanda.6

The intent of the Ethiopian approach has been to give greater autonomy to ethnic communities to manage their affairs.7 The country’s
constitution sanctions decentralized and autonomous regional administrations; however, political praxis has been at odds with these principles.
Ethiopia’s ethnic regions generate continuing controversy regarding their long-term effects on the country’s integrity. At one extreme,
some predict that the centrifugal dynamics of Ethiopia’s exclusive subnational identities will lead to the country’s disintegration, particularly
since the new constitution guarantees the right to self-determination
up to secession. Proponents of this thesis cite the former Soviet Union
as a model of what happens when central government is weakened
in previously authoritarian and ethnically divided societies.8 Second,
supporters of the ethnically based dispensation note that the new
federalism is a novel departure for Ethiopia that cannot be reversed
despite teething problems.9 Third, other critics claim that the dominant
party at the center has reneged on its democratic promise by illegally
subverting free ethnic political mobilization.10
All three claims have some merit. An implosion of the federal system could become a reality if national leaders and regional authorities
are unable to produce a legitimate political and economic system that
matches the aspirations of different communities. It is also the case that
the new order has introduced the limited freedoms that most Ethiopians already enjoy. Finally, evidence suggests that those in power in
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Addis Ababa harass ethnic organizations in the regions that have centrist, democratic, or independence agendas.11
Other important aspects of the debate indicate that the dominant
political party and economic practice will determine the viability of
ethnic federalism.12 The preeminent party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and its affiliate, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), have a strategic role in determining the
longevity, character, and vitality of a federated Ethiopia. The governing party’s accomplishments are portrayed in one of two ways. Some
describe the TPLF as liberating and democratizing.13 Others paint a
picture of a conniving, but ultimately Tigray-dominated system.14
These studies rarely examine the internal dynamics of ethnic regions to
assess the actual balance of power between the center and the regions.
Two of the few such attempts are Markakis’ sketchy research note and
Khalief and Martin’s decidedly uncritical presentation of the Somali
case.15
Drawing on material from the Somali Region, this article posits
that the post-1991 dispensation opened new opportunities initially, but
that the governing party’s manipulation of internal regional politics
derailed the promise of an autonomous and legitimate local administration that could remedy past ailments. The TPLF/EPRDF’s capacity
to manage regional authorities depends on the quality and legitimacy
of local leadership and the political coherence of provincial communities. Thus, the best prospect for autonomous regions within the Ethiopian federation lies in a collaboration between regional leadership that
is accountable to local people and a national authority that balances
its interests with those of the federation. Conversely, the prospects for
viable and autonomous regions dim when the regime at the center is
domineering and the regional authority is ill equipped.
This essay examines the political dynamics generated by Ethiopia’s
division into ethnic regions. Specifically, it demonstrates that the central
government’s attempts to tightly control regional political processes
undermine the essence of regional self-rule that the federal constitution mandates. Making the situation more precarious, inept regional
elites waste opportunities to enhance regional autonomy. The evidence
has been gathered from the Somali Region (Region 5) since 1995 and
mainly consists of individual and group interviews. The names of all
the sources are withheld to ensure their personal safety. Each source is
numbered in the text.16
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The rest of the article consists of three parts. Part one sketches the
forces involved in the initiation of Ethiopia’s new federal system. It
underscores the weakness of regional parties that were invited to the
national conference that produced the federal structure. The determination and ability of the TPLF to ignore many of the demands of major
regional parties, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), created
a strong perception from the start that regional authorities served at
the pleasure of the dominant party. The second section assesses political developments in Region 5 since the collapse of the old regime. It
briefly summarizes the history of the region’s liberation struggle and
its relations with the Somali Republic, and highlights how the Somali
military government (1969–91) subjugated the population’s desire for
liberation to its own agenda. The military regime’s domination of the
liberation movement undermined the capacity of the local population
to craft a coherent regional project. This analysis is followed by an
examination of the establishment of the Somali Region in 1991 and of
the role federal authorities played in determining which Somali party
led the regional administration. Initially, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)17 became the only regional party openly opposed
to the federal agenda to direct a new administration. However, the
rule of the ONLF did not endure and the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL) replaced it in the 1995 regional election. At this
point, the Somali Region had the most competitive regional elections
in Ethiopia. Despite this exceptional democratic transfer of power, the
federal authorities “indirectly” appointed the region’s president, and
the new ruling party made important changes in the way the region
was administered. The federal authorities exploited internal party conflict and abruptly terminated the party’s tenure. Furthermore, the federal authorities not only forced a merger of the two Somali parties and
created a new one but their representatives moreover managed and
directed the “congress” that established the new party. In the process,
they “helped” appoint the new regional president. The imposed unification of the two Somali parties terminated spirited electoral competition in the region. These developments brought political practice in the
region into line with the rest of the country. The final section reflects
upon the consequences of fractious and inept local leadership and
excessive federal intervention for regional autonomy and local democracy.
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II. Regional Authority and the New Federation
The TPLF’s decision to use ethnicity as way to mobilize first the Tigray
population,18 and second, other nationalities, against the brutal military regime was an expedient and strategic decision, particularly given
the Amhara colonization of the state. Having defeated the military
oligarchy in its home territory by 1988, TPLF realized that it could not
march to the national capital and impose a Tigray regime in place of
the Amhara. Consequently, it formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included junior partners
from Amhara, Oromo, and other national groups. Many EPRDF members, particularly the Oromos (from the Oromo People’s Democratic
Organization or OPDP) were prisoners of war in the TPLF camps.
Once it captured the capital in 1991, the TPLF-led EPRDF convened a
national conference. Those invited to the conference belonged to ethnically based movements, some of which had only recently formed.19
The EPRDF’s most important new ally was the independent and popular OLF, representing the largest ethnic group. Despite the collage
of ethnic participants in the conference, the military victors clearly
controlled the conference’s agenda.20 However, the collaboration of
autonomous groups, such as the OLF, enhanced EPRDF’s credibility.
The conference produced a national charter that laid the groundwork
for the to-be-constituted Ethiopian federation. The transitional government that was then formed marched to EPRDF’s tune, with the TPLF as
its political and military leader.
The first major rift between the EPRDF and the autonomous
national liberation movement, the OLF, became public in 1992.21 The
OLF claimed that EPRDF troops harassed and intimidated its people,
and the dominant party’s refusal to postpone the 1992 election led the
OLF to renounce the coalition.22 The OLF alleged that the election was
rigged in favor of the dominant party and its supplicant Oromo ally,
the OPDO.23 The OLF withdrew from the transitional government.
Shortly thereafter, the Tigray (TPLF) troops humiliated the OLF by
capturing 20,000 of its soldiers in their camp. The defeat of the OLF
signaled that the victor was not going to be detracted from turning
its agenda into the national program. Many informed people viewed
the electoral “victory” of the EPRDF/OPDO in Oromia in 1992 and the
harassment and persecution of the OLF as a bad omen for the constitutionally sanctioned federalism anchored in autonomous regions.24
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The departure of the OLF meant the removal of the largest and most
popular party from the political scene. Political organizations that
were junior partners in the EPRDF coalition came to power in most of
the country after the 1992 regional elections. The Somali Region was
an exception, since the ONLF formed the first regional authority. The
ONLF was neither a member of the EPRDF coalition nor an ally of
the ruling party. This party refused to participate in the dialogue that
produced the transitional charter. Instead, it advocated the immediate
secession of the Somali Region from Ethiopia. This party remained
in power for a brief period. The Somali People’s Democratic League
(SPDL), a friend of the EPRDF, replaced it in 1995. The League was,
in turn, displaced by the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) in
1998. A narrative of the political history of the Somali Region since
1991 shows the relative roles of ethnic political parties and the ruling
party in Ethiopian federalism.
III. Politics in Somali Ethiopia since 1991
Analysts often point to the TPLF’s organizational and leadership skills
and its cadres’ discipline as a national asset.25 The future role of other
ethnically based parties in the evolution of the Ethiopian polity requires
an assessment of the quality of these parties and their legitimacy.
Establishing an ethnic federation acceptable to the various groups will
require representative parties from all communities to broker the necessary political and economic compromises. In an ideal world, ethnic
equals will come together to create a federation on a mutual basis. But
Ethiopia is not an ideal context. As an ethnic liberation movement with
national leadership ambitions that defeated the old regime, the TPLF
resolved to remake Ethiopia under its tutelage. If other ethnic liberation movements had significantly helped defeat the military dictatorship, then the nature of the post-Derg dispensation might not have
been so lopsided. The TPLF movement introduced a democratically
promising element into Ethiopia’s political milieu. However, those militarily weak movements that had democratic aspirations were faced
with a stark choice: stay in the game, within circumscribed limits, and
try to push the democratic agenda from within or retreat to the bush
and engage in a liberation war. The immediate choice made by significant elements of the Somali community to play by the TPLF rules was
the wise one. The alternative that ONLF advocated would have been
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catastrophic, as it would have thrust an unprepared Somali population
into war with Ethiopia’s new regime.
A. Liberation Politics in Somali Ethiopia
A brief explanation of the history of the Somali Ethiopian Liberation
movement will shed light on the limiting conditions the Somali community has faced in the post-1991 period. The first organized liberation movement in the Somali territory under Ethiopian jurisdiction,
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), came into existence a
few years after Somalia gained its independence in 1960.26 The Somali
Republic’s Constitution sanctioned liberation of Somali territories in
Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. This essentially embedded
these liberation movements in inter-state relations and, more centrally,
in Somali regime politics. The liberation movement in Somali Ethiopia reached it zenith in 1977–78, when the military government in
Mogadishu committed its forces to “assist” the struggle. The liberation
movement had no autonomy from the Somali national army in this
effort. Nonetheless, the Somali Ethiopian population supported the
war despite the stranglehold. Somali successes were temporary once
the Soviet, Cuban, and Yemeni contingents intervened and helped
Ethiopian troops beat the Somali army. This defeat was catastrophic for
Somalia and the liberation movement. In Somalia an armed political
power struggle among the elite ensued, culminating in the state’s collapse and in the country’s disintegration in 1991.
During the interim period, 1978–91, the liberation movement lost
its autonomy because the Somali military regime used the liberation
movement for its own purposes, as many movement leaders became
henchmen of the new order. Those who disagreed with the tactics of
the regime were forced to flee the country; the unlucky individuals
rotted in jail. This treatment caused the movement to lose its grassroots identity and become a sycophant of the military rulers.27 The collapse of the state and the subsequent fragmentation of Somali society
into warlord territories, along with the rise of sectarian politics, had
dire effects on Somali Ethiopian politics. Although Somalis contributed
significantly to the weakening of the Mengistu regime, the liberation
movement was politically and militarily a spent force in 1991. Many
Somali Ethiopians who had moved to Somalia since the early 1960s
returned to Ethiopia after May 1991. Some of these were senior military
leaders and political entrepreneurs, steeped in sectarian elite games.
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B. Chaotic Transition: Disorganized Elite and Federal Interventions
The viability of an autonomous Somali Region in the new federation
depended on the interplay between a fractured Somali elite and TPLF
forces. This section demonstrates how disorganized Somali leadership
created opportunities for federal authorities to determine which party
ruled the region. The willingness of federal authorities to intercede in
local affairs signaled the problematic nature of “regional autonomy” in
Ethiopia. Regional autonomy should mean that local people are free to
choose representatives that are accountable to them.
Most Somalis everywhere rejoiced over the collapse of the Mengistu
government, particularly since former Somali regimes had supported
the TPLF. But some Somali Ethiopians had expectations contrary to
the designs of the TPLF. As TPLF troops gained control of the country,
the ONLF warned that Tigray troops should not cross into Somali territory. The ONLF threatened war in the Somali territory if its warning
was not heeded. Young men representing the ONLF came to Addis
Ababa, and the Sudanese government began to mediate an agreement
between the ONLF and the EPRDF. The ONLF representatives refused
to adopt EPRDF’s political scheme. Once EPRDF leaders understood
their position, it began to search for other Somali groups. The EPRDF
announced that people could form their own political parties. Before
long, the names of a dozen political parties appeared, supposedly representing various opinions. In the absence of an authentic liberation
movement representing the Somali community, the EPRDF sent for
the remnants of the WSLF, languishing in Mogadishu. These individuals were brought to Addis Ababa. The EPRDF proceeded with its
agenda and allocated four seats in the national conference to Somali
groups,28 except for the ONLF. The WSLF leaders, who received two
seats, wanted Somali representatives in the national conference to be
inclusive of all Somali groups; consequently, they decided to give one
of their seats to the ONLF.29
From the first encounter between the Somalis and the EPRDF, three
things became apparent. First, the EPRDF unilaterally decided how
many national conference representatives each participating ethnic
group would have. These allocations were based on estimates of the
relative sizes of different population groups in the country. Second,
the EPRDF decided which Somalis would participate in the conference. The ONLF’s initial exclusion from the participant list implied that
ethnic communities might not be free to choose their representatives.
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Third, the Somali Region was going to suffer from social fragmentation in the absence of a disciplined, institutionalized, and rooted liberation movement. The 1992 regional parliamentary election did not
change the political landscape. There were simply no organized and
established political parties that could compete with one another on
the basis of a political program. From the 37 Somali constituencies,
111 individuals were elected. The ONLF, as a nominal political party,
claimed the largest number of representatives. The newly elected representatives attended a seminar in Dire Dawa, the presumed capital of
the Somali Region, organized by the transitional government. According to numerous informants, Somali deputies paid scant attention to
the conference proceedings but concentrated on lobbying for posts in
Ethiopia’s first Somali regional government.
By counting all people of Ogadeni genealogical origin as the party’s
“natural members,” the ONLF wrongly assumed it had a sufficient
majority in the assembly to form the new government. Unfortunately
for the ONLF, many elected officials of Ogadeni descent did not
belong to this party nor share its clanist agenda. The WSLF had the
second largest group of elected members in the regional parliament.
As the parliament proceeded to elect government officials from its
ranks, active campaigning began for the executive committee posts:
regional president, vice-president, and secretary. Abdillahi Mohamed
Saadi organized his 33 genealogical groups within ONLF and gained
their support for his candidacy for president. Since Saadi was not the
ONLF’s official presidential candidate, his candidacy exposed the party’s lack of internal coherence, discipline, and election procedures.
Meanwhile, other groups in the regional parliament were becoming alarmed by the ONLF’s claim of being the majority party. Also
concerned about the ONLF’s sectarian agenda (excluding all Somali
groups except those of Ogadeni descent) and internal turmoil, these
other groups began to rally around an agenda inclusive of all Somali
groups. They nominated Sh. Abdi Nasir, an Ogadeni who strongly supported an inclusive political agenda, for the presidency of the region.
Professor Abdillahi and Eid Dahir were their candidates for vice president and secretary. Those nominated for the nineteen openings for the
Executive Committee of Parliament also represented a broad crosssection of the population. This inclusive approach forced the ONLF to
accept Saadi’s presidential candidacy rather than risk a split within its
ranks and thus the chance to control the regional government.
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At this point, the inclusive Somali group suspected that the ONLF
was communicating with EPRDF authorities in Addis Ababa.30 They
believed that the ONLF complained to the EPRDF authorities that
about eleven members of the regional parliament, who did not have
their approval and represented areas in which Somalis and Oromos
were competing for office, were participants in the deliberations. For
whatever reason, the EPRDF government intervened in local parliamentary matters and expelled eleven members from the regional
parliament. These changes sealed the ONLF’s victory in forming the
government, and Saadi was elected regional president.
The next major items on the parliament’s agenda were the region’s
official name, its flag, and the formal designation of Somali Ethiopia’s
capital city. The two most contentious agenda items were the identification of the capital city and the region’s name. The ONLF strongly
argued for adopting “Ogaden” as the region’s name. This motion was
defeated, and the name “Somali Region” won approval. Once the
debate on the selection of the regional capital began, the ONLF leaders
brought another faxed message from the federal authorities instructing
the Somali parliament to choose a town other than Dire Dawa, since
the Oromos also claim Dire Dawa as their city. The ONLF supported
the EPRDF’s position and proposed Godey, a small and remote town in
the far reaches of the region, as the capital. An emergency meeting was
called to consider Godey. This proposal was approved by the central
authorities, to the chagrin of most non-ONLF Somalis. Despite these
problems, this foundational meeting held in Dire Dawa resulted in the
first major Somali public celebration in Ethiopian history.31
The newly elected Somali leaders went to Addis Ababa to be introduced to Ethiopia’s transitional government. They met then-President
Zenawi, Prime Minister Layne, and the Somali Minister in the central government, Abdimajid Hussein.32 The transitional government
granted the Somali leaders a budget of six million Birr to finance their
immediate agenda. The three Somali leaders remained in Addis Ababa
despite the enormous and urgent duty of forming a functional regional
and local administration. The ONLF administration took another four
months to appoint regional departmental heads and district administrators. Such a lackadaisical attitude among its leaders boded ill for
the region’s viability. Two events illustrate this point. First, rather than
seeking professional advice about how to form a viable regional administration, they merely copied the structure of the central government.
The only posts left out were uniquely federal departments, such as
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Foreign Affairs and Defense. Second, the three senior leaders and some
members of the parliament’s executive committee divided the six million Birr among themselves to spend in the following ways. The president and the secretary purchased vehicles with some of the money. The
vice-president allocated some money for use in areas in which Somalis
and Oromos were competing for office. When the executive committee members complained about being left out of the spoils, they were
given a share of the funds to purchase chairs and tables. These actions
were taken without parliamentary approval and without recording the
expenses.33
This inappropriate managerial approach displeased some executive committee members, who complained to the federal authorities.
They were told to convene their parliament and sort out their differences with the regional administration. The group heeded this advice,
returned to Godey, and requested an urgent meeting of parliament.
Meanwhile, some ONLF members were disgusted with what they perceived as systemic corruption in the regional government and called
for its dismissal.
Parliament was called into session. The first agenda item was to formulate operational rules and local laws. While debating these matters,
disgruntled ONLF members intensified their demand for a change of
government. Given the threat to his post from within the party’s ranks,
Saadi, the regional president, believed that non-ONLF parliamentarians were his allies. After all, they were not calling for his removal
from office. In the meantime, a group of MPs, mostly from the Jigjiga
zone, organized themselves as a parliamentary bloc (15 members) and
pushed a collective “Jigjiga agenda.” The Jigjiga bloc agreed to nominate their members to official posts based on merit. The group’s cohesion made it into a powerful alliance within parliament whose support
others sought.34
In an attempt to bring down the government, thirteen appalled
executive committee members resigned as a group. This precipitate
action created an immediate crisis. Other executive committee members urged parliament to replace those who resigned. At this point,
the speaker of the national assembly, Dawit Johannes, and a Somali
member of the assembly, Abdulaziz Ahmed, came to Godey. They told
the regional president that he could not stay in power legally after the
resignation of thirteen executive committee members. They urged parliament to re-elect or replace the members who had resigned.35
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A new campaign for executive branch posts ensued. The ONLF
abandoned its former office bearers and nominated Abdirashid Ahmed
as president, Professor Abdillahi as vice-president, and Abdi Illah as
secretary. Other members of parliament formed a grouping called the
United Zones (UZ) and nominated Hassan Gire, Abdi Illah, and Eid
Dahir for the three posts. The latter group, whose core members were
from the Jigjiga zone, negotiated with Abdi Illah’s kinsmen and offered
them the vice presidency. The two parties agreed on this. However,
this covenant fell apart as Abdi Illah reneged and attacked Eid as unfit
for the secretary’s post. The UZ group withdrew from the agreement.
A new executive committee was elected, much to the ONLF’s chagrin.
In September 1993, the committee elected the UZ group ticket to form
the new government.36
The newly elected president and his associates went to Addis Ababa
to meet the federal authorities. Apparently, the ONLF cadre asked the
new non-ONLF—but Ogadeni—president and his deputy to claim to
be ONLF to boost the “Ogaden” cause. The president did this in a
national radio interview. The secretary, Eid Dahir, contradicted him on
the same radio program. Despite the president’s radio announcement,
the ONLF cadre and loyalists harassed the new government in Godey.
President Hassan Jireh’s team began to appoint new administrators for various posts. In a short period they appointed 77 directors of
offices, a number that exceeded the sum of the federal government’s
offices. The regime proceeded to appoint 261 teachers for every zone
in the Somali Region.37 It was simply following a central government
directive indicating that this number of teachers could be hired per
zone. The trouble with the Somali regime’s approach was that hardly
any of its zones, with the exception of Jigjiga and maybe two other
places, had enough schools to absorb this many teachers. The starkest example of this misuse of regional resources was the deployment
of 261 teachers to the Fiiq zone, an area with only one elementary
school, which could use about six teachers.38 By contrast, Jigjiga—with
53 schools, including the only senior secondary school in the Somali
Region—received the same number of teachers. Furthermore, most of
the newly employed teachers did not have the necessary training and
qualifications; others were phantoms.
The ONLF was unhappy about being excluded from partaking in
the spoils and called for a parliamentary meeting in early 1994. The UZ
group supported this proposition, but asked that the meeting be held
in Jigjiga. The ONLF did not like the change of venue but agreed to it
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as long as its key concern, formal debate over regional self-determination, appeared on the agenda. The UZ realized that it could not resist
the inclusion of this item in the debate, as that would have handed the
ONLF a major propaganda victory. Moreover, the UZ added a point on
the agenda that would free regional and federal authorities to fight Itihaad, the militant Muslim group. Most UZ members suspected that the
ONLF and Itihaad were connected. Parliament meekly discussed the
Itihaad item and then approved it with overwhelming support. Next
the meeting turned its attention to self-determination.39 The delegates
agreed to form a parliamentary committee to negotiate with the federal authorities the terms of divorce. Most regional MPs had not read
the federal interim constitution and the procedures governing regional
self-determination. The few who had read it led the advocates of selfdetermination into a political confrontation with federal authorities by
convincing them to form this committee.
The intense emotional nature of the parliamentary debate on selfdetermination sidetracked ONLF deputies from trying to bring down
the non-ONLF regional government. The sense of victory felt by
supporters of immediate self-determination was short-lived, for the
committee never went to Addis Ababa to negotiate with the federal
authorities. However, when the federal authorities learned about the
Somali parliament’s decision to pursue self-determination, they immediately demanded that the parliamentary executive committee call an
urgent meeting of parliament to inform members of the illegality of
their act and to reverse it. The meeting was called, although many
ONLF members refused to attend. The president left for Addis Ababa
after giving his blessing to the meeting. Afterwards, key ONLF members convinced the president that, if the parliamentary meeting continued, it would do great harm to their interests. The president faxed
a message to the executive committee, telling them that their meeting
was illegal.40 Furious about the president’s acts, the committee decided
to fire him. They also accepted his deputy’s resignation when he quit in
protest at the meeting.
The federal authorities intervened in regional political affairs for a
second time. The prime minister’s office changed its view on the ONLF
as the major party in the region. As parliament began to elect the third
regional government, the federal authorities reversed their earlier decision to expel MPs from the areas that were contested by Oromos and
Somalis. The induction of these individuals into parliament enabled the
UZ group to elect Ugas Abdirahman and Ahmed Makahiil as president
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and vice president, with Eid Dahir as secretary. The UZ group elected
Abdirahman as president in late 1994, because the group thought he
shared their inclusive political agenda. The new government decided
to temporarily transfer the capital city to Jigjiga. President Abdirahman and his deputies journeyed to Addis Ababa to become acquainted
with the federal authorities. The president was interviewed on national
radio and asked about the transfer of the capital from Godey to Jigjiga.
He denied that this had occurred, but others contradicted him. The
Somali federal minister, Hussein, met the president, the secretary, and
one influential executive committee member. A heated debate ensued
between the president and the other two. The secretary and the other
executive committee member, with encouragement from the federal
minister, impressed on the president that the federal authorities were
contemplating dividing the Somali Region into at least two provinces
because of internal political acrimony. The president was startled by
this news and immediately told his colleagues that the discussion
should come to an end.41 In the meantime, the federal prime minister
went to Godey to explain to Somali elders the self-determination process as articulated in the constitution.
The agreement between the federal minister and the regional president and his deputies to work together for the common good did not
prevent the president from pushing a sectarian political agenda once
he returned to Godey.42 Ugas Abdirahman, encouraged by eleven executive committee members, resisted the official transfer of the capital to
Jigjiga. Moreover, he tried to halt the national census being conducted
in the region. This last act infuriated the federal authorities, who asked
the executive committee to come to Addis Ababa for consultations.
Prime Minister Zenawi inquired why the Somali Region was not making progress. Ugas Abdirahman responded that the region’s troubles
were the result of interference from people in the federal prime minister’s office. Other committee members disagreed. The prime minister
warned the committee that the federal government might have no
choice but to convene a meeting of elders in the region and inform
them that their elected officials were not working on their behalf.43 He
explained that the elders could then decide to fire them all. Premier
Zenawi warned them that they had one last chance to reform and to
act responsibly.
The executive committee returned to Jigjiga, fired the entire region’s
senior employees, and began drawing up job descriptions and qualification for future employees.44 They also dismissed the president in
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early 1995, when he refused to carry out the decision to transfer the
capital to Jigjiga. (The capital was subsequently moved to Jigjiga.)
Political instability characterized the Somali Region during this early
period of transition in Ethiopia. The principal factors responsible for
this condition were poor Somali leadership and the absence of disciplined political organizations that could hold leaders accountable.
A secondary source of turbulence was federal interventions during
which some members of the regional parliament were expelled and
then reinstated to favor a particular political outcome.
IV. A Glimpse of Democracy and Regional Autonomy
The 1995 election marked a new beginning for the Somali Region. A
better-organized political party with a broader popular base defeated
the ONLF. The Somali Region became the only province in the country
in which a governing party was defeated but retained a significant
number of seats in the regional parliament. Meanwhile, the federal
leaders tacitly informed the new Somali party who its regional president should be. This constituted a major federal intervention that
would seriously corrode regional autonomy. Despite electoral success,
internal squabbles induced a major political crisis in 1997. This section
examines these developments.
As the political struggles noted in the previous section unfolded,
another Somali political movement was slowly gaining ground. A
handful of Somalis in Addis Ababa, who were disturbed by the clanist
thrust of Somali political parties, gathered in 1991 to forge a more
inclusive Somali organization. They convened a dinner with the blessing of the two Somali vice ministers in the federal government, Abdi
Adan and Shamsudiin Ahmed. However, their attempt at political
union fizzled away because of the ONLF’s refusal to compromise.45
In April 1992 some members of the group reconvened and formed
the Committee of the Whole, with twelve members, each representing
a political constituency. They elected three committee officers: Suliman
Ahmed, Abdulaziz Ahmed, and Hassan Fayanbiro, as president, vice
president, and secretary, respectively. The 1992 regional elections were
held before the Committee of the Whole made further progress as a
political party.
The elections marked another setback for the formation of a united
Somali political coalition. After many meetings and deliberations,
these groups assembled on 12 February 1994 at the unused military
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facility in Hurso, on the rail line 26 kilometers west of Dire Dawa. The
purpose was to form one political party, and participants agreed on a
broadly representative system reflective of the proportions of various
groups in the Somali population. The 1,500 delegates who assembled
in Hurso affirmed the working group’s decisions. Among the many
decisions endorsed were the party’s name, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic League (ESDL), and party colors. The organizing committee
also nominated Hussein, the federal Somali Minister, as the party’s
chairman.46 Although Hussein was not a key organizing committee
member, the delegates unanimously approved the recommendation.
They also elected Vice Minister Shamshudiin Ahmed as Secretary of
the party for similar reasons.
The new party had little time or resources to prepare for the 1995
national and regional elections. It sent a delegation to the Republic of
Djibouti to solicit financial support from Somali Ethiopians and other
Somalis. The group was well received and raised over $30,000 and
obtained several vehicles. The League confronted the ONLF in the
elections and won nearly two-thirds of the seats in the regional council and all seats in the federal chamber. This competition between these
Somali parties—with contrasting political programs—meant that the Somali
Region had the most competitive and “democratic” elections in the new ethnic
federation. The League then formed its central committee. According to
the League’s founding principles, each major Somali group was to be
represented by one person in the central committee.47 The first act of
the new regional parliament was to elect the 21 executive members.
The committee proceeded to elect a president, vice president, secretary, and regional bureau heads. Before the party chose its candidates for these offices, it became apparent that the federal government
preferred some candidates over others. The League’s vice chairman,
evidently trying to curry favor with Dawit Johannes, a senior federal officer, showed the latter a list of individuals who would be the
region’s new leaders. Johannes informed the vice-chairman that the
responsibility for selecting regional government heads rested with the
parliament. However, federal authorities continued to favor particular
individuals.48 This marked the third major federal intervention in the
Somali Region’s local political affairs.
Hussein traveled to Jigjiga to participate in the formation of the
new regional government. He called Eid Dahir and Ali Abdi for consultation49 and told them about the “advice” he had received from the
federal authorities regarding who should be the region’s president and
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vice president. President Zenawi preferred Eid Dahir and Ali Abdi to
lead the government. However, since Ali Abdi had been elected to the
federal parliament, he could not become vice president.50 Hussein was
concerned about the federal authorities’ favored list because Eid and
the minister belonged to the same genealogical group. He was deeply
worried about the negative political impact Eid’s appointment would
have on the party and its inclusive agenda. Ali Abdi urged Hussein
to support Eid for the presidency, given his relatively superior performance as secretary in previous governments. The League’s executive
committee felt compelled to accede to the federal authorities’ “recommendations.” Eid Dahir and Abdillahi Mohamed were elected president and vice president. Ahmed Makahiil, who had formerly been
acting president, refused to transfer authority to the newly elected
officers and was arrested and later sentenced to seven years in prison.
A party with a more coherent political agenda began to govern the
region for the first time, and the constant intensive internal competition for posts that marked previous regional government diminished
noticeably. The party’s unity enabled the executive committee to put
into place regional administrative regulations and submit them for
parliamentary approval. The parliament and the government were acting as partners in the region’s rehabilitation. With technical advice
from the prime minister’s office, League authorities began to present annual recurring and capital budgets to the federal government.51
As the regional administration became more systematic and accountable, the budget allocation began to increase. Unfortunately, given the
region’s limited absorptive capacity, a large portion of these funds was
unused and reverted to the federal treasury. As the region’s capacity
to utilize the budget grew, federal advisers, who had the power to
make final decisions, made it difficult for the region to spend budgeted
funds.52
The League government also strove to insure that political appointments to regional bureaus were inclusive of all Somali groups. In
addition, a categorical decision was made to make all professional
appointments on merit. The first major sign that the League government was serious about professionalizing its administrative and technical cadre was the mass re-examination of schoolteachers. Teachers who
wanted to keep their jobs were asked to submit original copies of their
certificates and take a re-qualification examination in 1996. Unqualified teachers and those who failed the examination were fired. More-
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over, all the phantom teachers disappeared from the payroll. Cleaning
up the rest of the region’s public services proceeded at a slower pace.
The League administration enjoyed a degree of legitimacy in the
region, except in the areas where ONLF members or Itihaad held sway.
The government made some progress in its development program.
For example, new water wells were drilled in the more arid parts of
the region. Likewise, a teacher training college and a nurses’ training
school were established in Jigjiga. Despite these tangible government
accomplishments, the public remained concerned about the dominance of the TPLF military in the region and its excessive influence.53
Some government members noted that part of this influence resulted
from the impotence of some senior regional administrators.54 Most
individuals had two conflicting views about federal influence. First,
they approved of the military presence because it prevented the spread
of the Somali civil war into Region 5. Many noted that if the ONLF had
come to power without a federal military presence, its agenda would
have forced most Somalis to resist its clanist rule. Second, the majority of public officials and the general citizenry felt that the EPRDF’s
interventions in local politics and regional administration undermined
local development (except when Somalis sought such assistance). The
vast majority of those interviewed thought that the federal authorities could remove any regional government from power if the latter
digressed from the EPRDF’s agenda.55
In spite of these limitations, the League government had a relatively long lifespan—two years—in contrast to its predecessors. The
public thought that the regional government enjoyed EPRDF support, although the League had not formally joined the EPRDF political
umbrella. However, the public’s perception was not accurate, as events
in the summer of 1997 revealed. Serious differences existed between
the regional president and many of the party’s executive committee
members, which gradually undermined the League’s unity. Observers agree that the president failed to delegate authority to his regional
ministers.56 The gulf between the president and senior party colleagues
was exposed in 1997 when the League initiated a dialogue with the
ONLF to explore the prospects of the two parties uniting. Participants
in this discussion and others noted that the president tried to subvert
the conversation by acting in contradiction to what the two parties
had agreed.57 While the dialogue between the League and the ONLF
was occurring, the EPRDF government had its own secret negotiations
with the ONLF. The secret nature of the ONLF-EPRDF talks troubled
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League members, who became convinced that the EPRDF had a different agenda than theirs.
The League president’s management style and political behavior
was reported to the party’s chairman. The chairman informed the
president of the party’s concerns, but continued to support him. The
tug-of-war between the president and the party’s executive committee
persisted. An incident in Jigjiga in autumn 1997 turned the conflict into
a major political crisis. A guard of the regional police commissioner
thrashed the director of a regional bureau. Many suspected the police
commissioner of masterminding the incident since he was at odds with
the victim. The president of the Somali Region failed to deal with the
affair until public commotion compelled him to report the event to the
executive committee. He tried to rush through his decision on the matter without enough discussion, and the executive committee refused to
comply until further investigation was conducted. The president then
left for the city of Harar.
The next day, fourteen executive committee members met. Informed
of the gathering, the police commissioner sent a contingent of his force
to surround the building where the meeting was held. The executive
committee members discussed the president’s authoritarian management style. They unanimously agreed, after lengthy deliberations, to
remove him from office. Two committee members reported this decision to the League secretary, who was in Jigjiga. Immediately, the secretary informed the party’s chairman, in Addis Ababa, of the events.
The secretary told the chairman that the group of fourteen requested
a meeting with him; the chairman gave the secretary the permission
to hold one. After a meeting with sixteen central committee members,
the secretary reported to the chairman that the group endorsed the
president’s removal from office, as it thought that its action would save
the party and the government from more serious trouble. The chairman was not happy with this outcome and considered the group to be
coup makers.58
The secretary returned to Addis Ababa and met the chairman. Hussein noted that the group of fourteen who had met in Jigjiga did not
constitute a quorum; consequently, their decision was invalid. He
immediately called a party meeting to undo the illegal decision. The
party met in Jigjiga and, contrary to the chair’s wishes, upheld the dismissal of the president. The party also censured the group of fourteen
for not following party rules and recommended that parliament decide
appropriate sanctions. This set the stage for a major political upheaval.
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V. Farewell to Democracy and Regional Autonomy
The party’s decisions were not implemented, and the federal authorities and the party chairman began to talk publicly about the “coup”
in the Somali Region. When parliament met, it confirmed the party’s decision, despite the “illegal” presence of EPRDF representatives.
EPRDF agents tried to intimidate MPs to change their minds but they
remained resolute. Moreover, the deployment of a new contingent
of federal troops in Jigjiga did not frighten members of parliament.
Parliament refused to lift the fourteen MPs’ parliamentary immunity
against prosecution until a select committee had completed its investigation.59 Of the fourteen MPs, one realized the EPRDF’s strategy was to
force parliament to withdraw their immunity so the federal authorities
could put them behind bars. He spoke bluntly in parliament and then
quietly slipped out of the country. The federal authorities organized a
meeting for unelected Somali elders, hand-picked by the federal military, to undo the party’s and parliament’s decisions, but the elders
declined to support the proposition. After much cajoling, parliament
succumbed to the federal agents’ wishes and the thirteen MPs were
hauled into detention. They remained in police custody for two-and-ahalf years. Finally, a local court convicted them, but they were released
from prison immediately, having already served their term. The presiding judge was subsequently demoted for failing to give the prisoners a harsher sentence. The fate of this judge confirms that the judiciary
is tightly controlled by the administration.60
The party’s chairman, backed by the federal authorities, refused to
heed the democratic wishes of members of the League and parliament.
His actions plunged the League into a deep crisis. In defiance of the
EPRDF’s flagrant attempt to manipulate and intimidate members of
parliament, the League unexpectedly decided to elect the ONLF’s secretary as the chairman of parliament.
The disorder in the League gave the federal authorities the opportunity to remake the political landscape, by far the most intrusive federal intervention in the region’s politics. Senior EPRDF cadres were
assigned to manage the Somali Region’s “reform.” These officials organized two separate meetings—one for the League and the other for
the ONLF.61 Shortly thereafter, the federal authorities called for the
creation of a supreme unification committee. The Deputy Prime Minister of Ethiopia, a key EPRDF member, gave clear instructions that
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the ONLF would chair the supreme unity committee, and the League
would occupy deputy-chairmanship.62
The EPRDF went ahead with its plan to unify the two parties.63
Each party was told to go through self-criticism.64 Senior EPRDF officials directed this process, a function legitimated when members were
asked to raise their hand if they wanted EPRDF officials to participate.
Given the presence of cadres, when this open vote was taken, many
Somalis in Jigjiga told the author that people were scared to deviate
from what the authorities wanted.65 A contrived self-criticism involved
party members admitting to misuse of regional resources.66 The party’s
chairman was stunned by these admissions as the charade unfolded.
Those who refused to admit wrongdoing or condemned the process
were fired. The same process took place in the parallel ONLF meeting. The two parties were then asked to select nine League and eight
ONLF members to a joint committee that would work on the merger
of the two parties. Shortly thereafter, the central committees of the
ONLF and the League met separately and selected 35 people from each
party to represent them in the merger. The 70 ONLF/League members
and 150 others brought in to take part in the convention met in Jigjiga
in June 1998.67 EPRDF officials openly managed these meetings. The
highlight was the announcement of the formation of a new party, the
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP). Neither the League nor the
ONLF approved the formation of the new party. A faction of ONLF
re-emerged as a renegade party and claimed that those of its members
who had joined the new governing party were stooges of the federal
authorities. By contrast, nearly all former League members who were
not selected to join the new party were doomed to languish in the
political wilderness.
The engineering of the new Somali party created unexpected circumstances at the federal level. The majority of Somali federal parliamentarians (MPs) and many former League members were excluded
from the new party. Of the original 25 Somali federal MPs, three fled
the country and sought political asylum. The chairman, who was the
only Somali minister in the federal system, resigned and took a job
with the United Nations in Geneva.68 In addition, two MPs claimed to
be neutral in the shifting political terrain, and three became members
of the new party. Another was silent about his position. The remaining
sixteen members constituted the only organized Somali political opposition to the EPRDF agenda.
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The new party consists of a 25-member Central Committee and
the nine executive members it elects. The executive committee elected
the region’s president, deputy president, and secretary.69 Many senior
regional government and party officials have attended the EPRDF’s
political education school (Tatiq) in Addis Ababa. Despite these
attempts to “reform” the party, it remains crisis-ridden, as indicated
by the struggles between the regional president, his deputy, and the
party’s executive committee in early 2002.70 The federal authorities
intervened in the struggle, and at one point removed the president from
his post only to reinstate him two days later.71 The conflict re-emerged
in the summer of 2003 and the president was removed from office. This
federal intervention reaffirms the public’s claim that the Somali party
has little or no real political autonomy from the EPRDF. Four reasons
are cited for this claim.
First, senior ruling party officials managed and directed the process
through which the Somali party was created. This is often contrasted
with the absence of the EPRDF’s significant strategic participation in
the League’s establishment. Moreover, the tactics used in abolishing
the old Somali parties have scared current Somali political leaders and
convinced them that they serve at the pleasure of the EPRDF bosses.
They point to EPRDF’s strategic use of unelected elders selected by the
federal authorities to reverse parliament’s decisions or to cajole that
body into adopting the ruling party’s agenda as proof of the blatant
contravention of the regional and federal constitutions.
Second, EPRDF officials, known as regional advisors, openly participated in parliamentary deliberations at the highest decision-making
level in the region, despite the claim that the advisors were serving at
the regional leaders’ discretion.72 The notion that federal advisors are
not decision makers may be theoretically valid. However, this is not
how things worked in practice.73 Numerous regional government officials and civil servants repeatedly told the author that the advisors had
intervened in very detailed matters, although “they are not supposed
to act in this manner.”74
Third, the EPRDF has adroitly managed to frighten the regional
leadership into submission. When the existing regional parties or individual leaders no longer serve the EPRDF’s purpose, it destroys them.
The regional government’s bizarre behavior in soliciting funds from
the public for the war effort in 1999–2000 underscores the subservience
of Somali leaders. Regional authorities required each rural community
to contribute a specified number of sheep to support Ethiopian troops
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in the war with Eritrea. Village elders were responsible for collecting
these “contributions.” Several elders from five villages told me that
they had no choice but to raise the desired number of sheep, even if the
villagers resisted. They added that the regional government was making these onerous demands just when a severe and prolonged drought
was devastating the livestock economy.75 The conduct of regional
authorities in this regard appears to support the proposition that they
derived their authority from Addis Ababa and were only marginally
accountable to the Somali population.
Fourth, an item in the SPDP’s program stated that the 1977 SomaliEthiopian war was an illegitimate and irridentist Somali attack.76 Very
few Somalis in the region agreed with this claim. The public surmised
that this was EPRDF propaganda and claimed that not a single Somali
had joined the Mengistu army to fight the Western Somali Liberation
Front and the Somali army.77 Furthermore, they pointed out that a
similar item condemning the TPLF’s support for Eritrea’s war of liberation should be inserted into the TPLF party program.
The EPRDF waited for the 2000 national elections to get rid of its
critics. EPRDF and its client Somali party engaged in all kinds of political maneuvering to defeat the renegade candidates and to bring compliant MPs into the federal parliament.78 The EPRDF beguiled elders
in such a way that the opposition would have no chance to compete
effectively in the election. There were only two instances in which
the strategy failed. The SPDP nominated candidates for all constituencies. Community leaders in the two areas refused to endorse the
candidates. Instead, they endorsed sitting MPs who were members of
ESDL. The leaders of the two communities resisted the pressure since
one of these two candidates had served his community well during
the drought and famine, and had earned its respect and support. The
second candidate stayed in touch with his constituency. The governing
party realized it would loose in the two areas. Consequently, it decided
to induct the candidates of the communities into the party without
their consent. This about-face of the federal authorities and the SPDP
shows that the only shield that elected regional officials have against
federal intimidation is to maintain close ties with their constituencies.
All other renegade candidates lost the election.79 The victory resulted
in amenable MPs, grateful to the federal authorities, assuming Somali
parliamentary seats in Addis Ababa. The change signaled the end of an
era in regional and Ethiopian politics and sealed the slight democratic
aperture that had permitted a degree of regional autonomy.
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Field observation and extensive interviews support the public’s
claims that the SPDP is the creation of the EPRDF. The SPDP’s virtual
collapse through internal political conflict over the region’s population
census and the list of candidates for the 2000 elections created the fleeting possibility for alternative parties to emerge.80 However, none of the
rival parties had the resources and EPRDF support to mount a credible
challenge to the SPDP. Not a single independent or opposition candidate won a seat in the federal parliament. In addition, keen observers
note that the federal authorities were dissatisfied with the regional
president and orchestrated his replacement sometime before the election was held.81
VI. Conclusion
A rationale for reorganizing Ethiopia’s internal administrative division
along ethnic lines was that it was designed to grant ethnic communities
regional autonomy to manage local affairs in order to eliminate past
injustices and enhance the state’s legitimacy. This reasoning is rooted in
three assumptions: (1) ethnicity per se is the main cause of conflicts; (2)
ethnic communities are internally homogeneous and share a common
political agenda; and (3) state inefficiency and illegitimacy are caused
by the colonization of state institutions by certain ethnic groups. The
first two assumptions are based on spurious evidence and confuse the
consequences with the causes of civil strife.82 The last assumption contains important elements of truth in some regions. The validity of the
circumscribed third assumption means that we should carefully examine the nature of ethnic domination of a state and its consequences for
political reform.
A case-by-case evaluation of the political history of particular counties or regions makes general statements about the links between ethnicity, political reform, and regional autonomy tenuous. For example,
a unified ethnic coalition that defeats the “ethnic state” creates different
reform possibilities than an ethnic liberation movement that topples the
old ethnic state. In the first instance, if multiple ethnic groups have
contributed to the struggle for liberation, it is impossible for one ethnic group to control the new national defense force, because all participants contributed to the downfall of the old order and thus jointly
control different segments of the liberation army. Consequently, if no
single group can claim that it has liberated the country, then no group
has the unilateral right to set the reform agenda. In such cases, post-
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reform restructuring may factor in ethnicity as an important variable in
balancing regional and ethnic representation, but in ways that will not
reproduce old patterns of domination or generate new ones. In contrast, if one ethnic group’s liberation movement defeats the old regime,
then other ethnic groups not represented in the liberation army may
not have effective ways of keeping the new authority accountable.
The Ethiopian case is one in which a powerful ethnic liberation
group (TPLF) decisively overthrew the old regime. This has had farreaching implications for the balance of power between different ethnic
groups in the reform era and for the nature of regional autonomy, as
the Somali case shows. Four EPRDF acts give evidence of the severely
limited degree of freedom of Somali parties and regional governments,
and demonstrate the federal ruling party’s pre-eminence. First, the
selection of the Somali minister in the federal cabinet was the prerogative of the ruling party alone. This may have been appropriate during
the transitional government of 1991–94, before regional and national
elections had been held. Once Hussein resigned, however, the Prime
Minister did not even consult Somali federal MPs when appointing
his replacement.83 Second, the authorities in Addis Ababa selected the
first and only League president in the Somali Region. EPRDF leaders
informed Hussein that they preferred Eid as the regional president. The
federal authorities’ practice of helping select Somali Region presidents
has not changed. Current and previous presidents serve at the pleasure of the authorities in Addis Ababa.84 Third, the intervention in
the League’s affairs, the establishment of the SPDP, and the EPRDF’s
use of non-elected elders to “discipline” the regional parliament to act
“responsibly” makes a mockery of the federal constitution in word and
spirit. Finally, the use of advisers in the regions undermines the elected
regional leaders’ authority. Consequently, the regional authority and
institutions remain shells rather than developing into autonomous structures within the federation.
These four examples demonstrate that the TPLF and its umbrella
political organization, the EPRDF, determined which Somali political
party and leaders would govern the region. The Somali Region is not
unique in this regard, as I discovered in my travels in several other
ethnic regions, such as Oromia, Afar, and the Southern Nationalities
Region. The repercussions of this centralization of political power are
that the Somali population has little choice when electing a party and
government to manage local affairs. The EPRDF has been able to sideline the Somali population’s voice in the Somali Region because, since
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the days of the struggle for liberation, the national army has mainly
consisted of TPLF soldiers. Such an exclusion from the process has
made Somali leaders susceptible to EPRDF pressure. This vulnerability, combined with the incompetence and opportunistic tendencies of
many Somali political leaders, creates conditions in which these individuals vie for personal favors from the federal authorities. Further,
many Somali regional and federal parliamentarians report that they
fear for their lives if they disagree with federal leaders.85 Five of the
past seven Somali Region presidents (and many others) have served
prison terms after they were forced out of office.
The evidence from the Somali Region confirms that Ethiopia consists
of ethnic provinces that lack the local autonomy that the federal constitution enjoins. When local populations are prevented from electing
their representatives, a consequential element of regional autonomy
is lost. This system subverts the prospect of democratic and autonomous regional institutional development. The absence of legitimacy
enhances the role of the security apparatus in maintaining the federation, and the defense machine is already devouring a major share of
the country’s meager resources.86
Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s ethnic and decentralized political system,
despite the EPRDF’S heavy-handed dominance, is undoubtedly an
advance over the old regime. Ethnic communities enjoy some rights.
For example, Somalis, who were not recognized as a community in
the Ethiopian polity, have been acknowledged to be the fourth largest
population group (some say the third) in the country since 1992.87 The
official admission of the existence of a Somali Region in Ethiopia contradicts old axioms that Somalis are not stakeholders in the Ethiopian
state.88 Other benefits include Somali as the regional official language
and the medium of instruction in primary schools.
These vital gains are in peril as the regime tightens its control over
regional affairs and thus resuscitates old hostilities. The only way to
rehabilitate the spirit of the political changes of 1991 is for regional
communities to gain the freedom to choose their leaders. This case
study confirms that redrawing the country’s administrative map to
form ethnic regions cannot reform the ethnically based political injustices of the past. Legitimacy moored in local autonomy and democracy
alone can seal the fate of the old order and secure a viable federation.
Conversely, the perpetuation of current trends will deepen ethnic discord and could undo the federation.
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Finally, it was imperative to tackle the identity question head-on,
given the “ethnicization” of the state. Restoring the cultural and citizenship rights of the disenfranchised majority was essential for building an inclusive polity. Dividing Ethiopia into ethnic regions appeared
to be a reasonable and appropriate vehicle for redressing past grievances while maintaining the unity of the country. However, the power
imbalance between those who hold authority at the center and regional
leaders/cultural communities undermined the promise of the new era.
The evidence suggests that a different ethnic political order is being
constituted that could create a new state hierarchy, potentially impeding the emergence of civic culture and accountable political order.
The broader implication of the Ethiopian case is that, unless there is
a legitimate sharing of power, simply reorganizing a country’s administrative division along ethnic lines is not sufficient to neutralize the
“ethnicity problem.” The challenge is how to undo previous disenfranchisement by enabling local communities to govern their affairs without creating another exclusive centralized authority. The election of
2005 has been more open than any other election in the country’s history and the opposition has garnered nearly a third of the parliamentary seats. Somalis in Region 5 have yet to cast their ballots because the
federal authorities decided to postpone the election until September
2005. Nationally speaking, the election results provide an opportunity
to revisit the promise of the early 1990s, celebrate cultural differences,
acknowledge past ethnically based injustice without reifying ethnic
politics. Pursuing the latter will deepen the wedge between communities and induce a new civil war, and it is, moreover, destined to fail.89
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